The subject county (pop ~119,000) is benchmarked against the 7 nearest-population same-state counties (102k-140k). Holding state and size roughly constant isolates structural differences from size and state effects.
| County | Pop | Med income | Poverty | CHS | Energy * | Eviction * | Monopoly |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | 119,398 | $66,254 | 11.7% | 49.8 | 27.3 low | 61.7 elev | 4 |
| Peer A | 116,931 | $124,917 | 4.3% | 59.5 | 26.7 low | 39.5 low | 1 |
| Peer B | 116,634 | $50,448 | 20.9% | 39.9 | 33.7 elev | 68.0 high | 2 |
| Peer C | 124,860 | $64,809 | 17.0% | 47.3 | 33.9 elev | 64.0 elev | 4 |
| Peer D | 129,842 | $62,168 | 15.9% | 45.5 | 46.2 elev | 65.5 elev | 2 |
| Peer E | 104,917 | $70,112 | 12.4% | 46.0 | 38.5 elev | 56.0 elev | 3 |
| Peer F | 102,370 | $82,730 | 12.4% | 46.2 | 33.0 elev | 34.0 low | 2 |
| Peer G | 139,988 | $70,455 | 11.1% | 50.4 | 39.8 elev | 60.4 elev | 3 |
* Pre-calibration relative ranks (percentile vs all ~3,100 US counties), not published rates.
| Metric | Subject | Peer-group position |
|---|---|---|
| CHS 49.8 | mid | 3rd of 8 (two peers higher) |
| Energy Stress 27.3 | lowest of the 8 | the cooperative-utility + climate advantage shows |
| Eviction 61.7 | 4th-highest | above two peers, below three |
| Monopoly Stack 4 | tied highest | the structural-concentration outlier of the group |
| Median income $66,254 | mid | 4th of 8 |
| Poverty 11.7% | 2nd-lowest | only one peer lower |
Partially redacted in this sample.
It posts the lowest energy-stress score in the group (27.3 vs a peer median near 34) despite mid-tier income. The driver is structural: it is one of only two counties here on a cooperative utility rather than an investor-owned or high-rate provider.
The subject and one peer both carry 4 concentrated markets; the wealthier peers do not. The subject's energy advantage and monopoly disadvantage point in opposite directions, exactly the kind of split a single-county brief flattens.
The affluent peer ($125k income) sits at eviction 39.5 (low); the subject ($66k) at 61.7 (elevated); another peer ($83k) at 34.0 (low). The spread is driven by renter share and cost burden, not income level.
One peer is the affluent control in this size band (CHS 59.5, every stress index low, monopoly stack 1). It demonstrates what the absence of these structural stresses looks like at the same population, and the gap between it and the rest is the policy-relevant quantity.
These eight counties are within ~35k people of each other and all in one state, yet their Civic Health Scores span 39.9 to 59.5, a 20-point range, and their failure modes differ (one poverty-driven, one energy-driven, the subject monopoly-concentration-driven, one with none). A comparative brief converts "these are all mid-size counties" into "here is precisely where this county under- and over-performs its true peers, and which gap is closeable."
Same federal and state source stack as the Tier 1 brief (Census ACS + SAIPE, DOE LEAD, EIA-861, ORNL EAGLE-I, NOAA NCEI, CDC, EPA, NHTSA, IMLS / FEMA / LSC / USDA / NCES, GovParti registry). Every figure in the matrix is reproducible from cited public sources; per-index computation documented in GovParti's internal-equations appendix.